

# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

## Monterey, California



## THESIS

### SPECIAL FORCES ASSESSMENT AND SELECTION

by

Sean P. Feeley

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Thesis Advisor:  
Second Reader:

Erik Jansen  
Gordon H. McCormick

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
Sean P. Feeley  
Major, United States Army  
B.S., Radford University, 1987

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
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
Approved by:



Erik Jansen, Thesis Advisor



Gordon H. McCormick, Second Reader



Maurice D. Weir, Chairman  
Special Operations Curriculum Committee



## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) program conducted by the U.S. Army's John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS). It seeks to determine the most accurate and relevant method of testing potential Special Forces soldiers and officers. Thesis study focuses on the validity of the current personal attributes required in a Special Forces soldier and the current testing methods employed to measure the required attributes set forth by SWCS. It also explores the issue of an additional selection program for the potential Special Forces officer.

This study demonstrates that the current attributes required in the potential Special Forces soldier and officer are valid. However it recommends two additional attributes that will enhance the profile of the Special Forces soldier. It also demonstrates that the current testing methods of SFAS do not sufficiently test all the required attributes. This thesis recommends nine additional testing methods that adequately test all the required attributes for a Special Forces soldier and officer. This thesis focus on the assessment and selection program of SFAS; it does not discuss standards that must be achieved by the potential Special Forces soldier and officer.



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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

Indeed, the most important component of success in all our missions is the people we commit to them. We are continually seeking new and innovative ways to select the right people, ... All of our major programs for the future start with the premise that we must have the right people in the right place with the right training if we are to succeed (Downing, 1996).

### **A. BACKGROUND**

Army Special Forces places a strong emphasis on the quality of their soldiers. The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) is the organization responsible for the selection of these soldiers. This organization goes to great lengths to ensure that it has selected individuals who possess the personal attributes required to accomplish the Special Forces missions. It is the current Special Forces mission that dictates the personal attributes required in a Special Forces soldier. Additionally these attributes are the impetus behind the selection of these soldiers. The vehicle used to test, assess, and select the potential Special Forces soldier is the Special Forces Assessment and Selection course (SFAS). SFAS is "a sequential process of testing and evaluating soldiers with different measuring tools to determine which soldiers possess sufficient levels of the attributes required to be operationally successful"<sup>1</sup> (Sanders, 1997). The goal of SFAS is to select individuals who possess the attributes needed to successfully complete the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) and succeed in the Special Forces operational groups. The original purpose of the course was two-fold: First,

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<sup>1</sup> Dr. Mike Sanders is chief of the Fort Bragg office of the Army Research Institute (ARI). He and other psychologists provide support to the Special Operations

“provide highly suitable soldiers for Special Forces”<sup>2</sup> (Velky, 1990) and second, to prevent the Army from wasting money and training resources on individuals who are not compatible with Special Forces training and duty. (Velky, 1990)

The primary purpose of any assessment and selection program is to identify individuals who are suited to perform a specific function or job. Assessment and selection programs help prevent organizations from wasting valuable resources on unqualified individuals thus increasing efficiency and effectiveness. Accomplishing this, in turn, requires a valid set of selection criteria (attributes) and a relevant set of testing methods. The logic behind assessment and selection is that once an individual is selected he can be trained to perform a specific task. The organization that selects these individuals believes that if it has found the appropriate person for the job, only a tailored training program stands between the individual and his ability to perform a specific task. In this case performing the Special Forces missions. Individual suitability, in short, is a major factor in the success of any organization, Army Special Forces is no exception.

## **B. PURPOSE**

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the current SFAS program. It seeks to determine the most accurate and relevant method of identifying and testing the potential Special Forces officer. The focus of this thesis is the selection process for the potential Special Forces officer. With this consideration in mind, this study seeks to answer three

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Forces (SOF) community on a various SOF related topics.

<sup>2</sup> LTC James Velky, while working at the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, was one of the original project officers that established SFAS.

questions: First, are the current attributes desired in a Special Forces officer congruent with the Special Forces missions? Second, are the existing methods of testing the desired attributes accurate and relevant? And third, should the potential Special Forces officer be subjected to an additional selection process, and, if so, what would such a process entail?

There are two reasons for concentrating on the commissioned officer. First, the officer immediately fills the most critical position on the Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA). It is at the ODA level where success or failure is defined. The personal attributes that the officer brings to the ODA are important contributing factors for mission success. Therefore early positive identification and selection of the potential Special Forces officer is essential. The ODA is neither the place nor the time to discover that the officer does not possess the personal attributes needed to accomplish Special Forces missions. The officer must already possess all the critical attributes prior to volunteering for SFAS. There is neither time nor resources available to develop these critical attributes, even if they can be developed, *after* he is selected for Special Forces training.

The second reason for concentrating on officer selection is the resource constraints that naturally limit the selection process. Officers make up less than 15% of a SFAS class (Berry, 1998)<sup>3</sup>. It is feasible, therefore, to have an additional selection process for the officer without detracting from or compromising the entire SFAS process. Additionally, once the process for selecting the potential Special Forces officer has been refined, it may be extended, in part or in its entirety, to the entire SFAS process.

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<sup>3</sup> Major Berry is the Executive Officer of the unit that is responsible for SFAS.

The nature of Special Forces missions requires that soldiers be carefully selected. Special Forces missions are conducted by small groups of men, usually 12 or less, whose mission has strategic and/or operational significance. These men provide the warfighting Commander in Chief (CINC) an economical, flexible, and low-visibility option for conducting sensitive missions across the entire spectrum of conflict. The Special Forces officer is often placed at the "tip of the spear," where his actions spell success or failure. The ODAs, led by the officer, often conduct missions unilaterally with little or no direct supervision. They are expected to produce results that are far greater than their numbers. Special Forces officers cannot be mass-produced or created during a crisis. (Joint Pub 3-05, 1998) It is, therefore, critical that the selection process for these officers be germane, exact, and precise. Given the strategic importance of many Special Forces missions and the level of responsibility that the officer is charged with, it is crucial that the Special Forces officer be chosen correctly. Dr. Paul Berenson, in his memorandum to the Commanding General of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, highlights the importance of selecting officers with the correct personal attributes: "... the Army needs to pursue all ways of ensuring combat leaders have the "right stuff", to include screening out those people who do not have the essential innate personal characteristics required for combat leadership; this can and should be done"<sup>4</sup> (Berenson, 1998).

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<sup>4</sup> Dr. Paul Berenson. Ph. D., is the Scientific Advisor to the Commanding General of TRADOC. This memorandum was part of a briefing concerning warfare in the 21st century.

### C. RELEVANCE

There has been little critical analysis of the incumbent attributes and testing methods of the SFAS program. Additionally there has been no recent serious discussion of a separate or additional assessment and selection program for commissioned officers. A great deal of research in the area of increasing the selection rate without lowering the standards has been conducted by the Army Research Institute (ARI) and SWCS<sup>5</sup>. However, relatively little attention has been conducted on the testing methods SFAS employs to assess and select the Special Forces officer. There are two primary reasons why this area has not been explored more thoroughly. First, the overall attrition rate in SFAS is very high, 56.5 percent (Berry, 1997). With such a high attrition rate, it is easy to conclude that the program is a success and only the best officers and enlisted soldiers are advancing to the actual Special Forces training. The second reason is the high overall graduation rate, which is 85 percent, (Berry, 1998) in the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC), where the training of the Special Forces soldiers and officers is conducted. The high attrition rate in SFAS coupled with a very high graduation rate in SFQC suggests that SFAS is a success. Under the current SFAS program, the most qualified officers are being selected, according to the current testing methods, but are the most appropriate officers being selected?

In examining the officer attrition rate in SFAS and SFQC, two interesting facts emerge. Officers have the lowest attrition rate in SFAS (23%), but they also have a

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<sup>5</sup> ARI conducted a study called "Enhancing Army Special Forces". Portions of this study specifically focused on what can be done to increase the selection rate in SFAS.

significantly higher attrition rate in SFQC (40%) compared to the enlisted (15%) (Berry, 1998). Assuming comparable standards these statistics suggest that there is a flaw either in SFAS or the officers' SFQC. Based on the fact that SFQC is periodically revised and validated (at least every three years by the Critical Task Review Board) and SFAS has changed little since its inception, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the flaw lies in SFAS. Additionally, if SFAS is selecting the "right" officer, arguably, there should be a lower attrition rate in the officers' qualification course than presently exists. Since this is not the case, it is reasonable to assume that SFAS is not selecting the appropriate officer, or at least not to the degree that might be achieved. There can be only three reasons for this inconsistency. One, the attributes that are being tested for in SFAS are not the attributes needed to successfully complete the officer SFQC; two, the testing methods in SFAS are not congruent with success in the officer SFQC; or three, a combination of the above.

Assessment and selection programs will only be able to achieve their primary purpose if the selection criteria and testing methods are valid. Because the selection of the potential Special Forces officer is based upon particular attributes and specific testing methods, it is paramount that these attributes and testing methods be pertinent and relevant. If these attributes are wanting and the testing methods are not completely relevant, the entire process is self-defeating.

#### **D. METHODOLOGY**

The first part of this study provides an overview of the current SFAS program. It does this by discussing the history of SFAS and the mechanics of the course. This is



done in Chapter II. Chapter III defines the five doctrinal missions of Special Forces and discusses the personal attributes that are needed to accomplish each mission. This chapter has two purposes. First, it examines the validity of the current attributes based on an analysis of the five Special Forces missions. Second, it proposes additional attributes needed in the potential Special Forces officer based on the previous analysis. Chapter IV builds on Chapter III by assessing the testing methods of the current attributes that SFAS is based upon. Chapter V compares the existing SFAS testing methods with a proposed alternative program (testing methods) to ascertain which approach is best to achieve the SFAS objective in regard to selecting the appropriate officer. The proposed program uses the same methodology as the current SFAS course; it focuses on the attributes needed by a Special Forces officer and the methods of testing those attributes. This program offers a rudimentary model for an additional assessment and selection process for the potential Special Forces officer. It is intended to be an additional tool used to select the appropriate officer, not a detailed step-by-step program or a stand-alone substitute to the current selection program. Finally, Chapter VI, the conclusion, summarizes the findings of this study and offers recommendations to enhance the Special Forces officer corps and the Special Forces community.

This thesis does not explore specific testing *standards* or "cut-off scores" that must be achieved by the potential Special Forces officer. Developing selection standards is an entirely separate issue that is beyond the scope of this thesis. Moreover, this thesis does not discuss recruiting and training of potential Special Forces officers, although these are two very important issues. Recruiting and training fall beyond the scope of this study.



## **II. SPECIAL FORCES ASSESSMENT & SELECTION**

This chapter describes the SFAS course and the methodology for assessing Special Forces volunteers. First, it provides a historical background of SFAS and how it was developed. It then describes the mechanics of the actual course. Finally, it discusses the assessment and selection process that SFAS employs.

### **A. HISTORY OF SPECIAL FORCES ASSESSMENT & SELECTION**

The Army conducted the first SFAS course in June of 1988 at Camp Mackall, North Carolina. The course was created to serve two purposes: provide the operational force with the appropriate soldier and prevent the Army from wasting resources on candidates that are not compatible with Special Forces training. The Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) had an extremely high attrition rate and was costing the Army millions of dollars and showing insufficient return for its investment. It was financially unacceptable to commit substantial resources for unsuitable candidates. In the mid-1980's the deputy commander of Special Warfare Center & School (SWCS) recognized the need for a selection process and "began designing a program in which soldiers could be assessed before they attended the SF Qualification Course. In 1987, project officers from SWCS began working with the Army Research Institute to define desirable personality traits and effective methods of assessing human behavior" (Young, 1996).

Special Forces Assessment and Selection was based on a 14-month study conducted by ARI and three individuals that were designated as the project officers. The research and the development of SFAS was based on studies of other military and

paramilitary special operation units that use or had used an assessment and selection process to select their personnel. The research was primarily based on the British Special Air Service (SAS), Australian SAS and the defunct Office of Strategic Services (OSS) selection courses. The initial step the project officers took was "to define personality traits consistent with successful completion of Special Forces training and effective duty as a Special Forces soldier" (Young, 1996). The Army Research Institute, which analyzed successful soldier traits, derived the original attributes from a two-year study (1985-1987). The next step the project officers took was to devise methods to test the desired attributes. Methods to test the desired attributes were based on the project officer's first hand experience gained from participation in and observing the SAS selection course. (Velky, 1990)

"The nature of SFAS is not complex nor difficult to understand. It was founded to identify soldiers who can be trained to perform effectively in unpredictable, adverse and hostile environments and be dedicated to their profession" (Velky, 1990). The initial guidance to the project officers was to "find candidates that are reasonably fit, reasonably motivated, and reasonably intelligent"<sup>6</sup> (Potter, 1998). Based on this guidance and the research conducted by ARI, the following original attributes were determined to be essential to completing SFQC and effective duty in Special Forces (Velky, 1990):

- Physical fitness
- Motivation
- Intelligence

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<sup>6</sup> BG (Ret) Richard Potter was the senior officer directly involved with the

- Responsibility
- Stability
- Trustworthiness
- Sociability
- Leadership

Over the years SWCS has worked to refined its methodology to more accurately determine the attributes essential for accomplishing the Special Forces missions. The current attributes and their definitions are given in Chapter III. The current methodology employed by SWCS, which was implemented in 1995, now uses a "front end analysis of mission requirements" to derive the attributes that are desired in a Special Forces soldier. (Carlin & Sanders, 1996) These desired attributes are derived by analyzing the attributes that are required to accomplish all Special Forces missions. Once the mandatory attributes are identified the methods of testing the attributes are developed. This relatively new methodology did not significantly change the mandatory attributes or testing methods. The purpose of the testing methods or screening process is to determine if the candidate possesses the essential attributes identified in the mission analysis. If the candidate meets the screening requirements or standards, he is selected to attend SFQC. (Carlin & Sanders, 1996) "The unique nature of SFAS is twofold. In addition to selecting the right soldier for Special Forces, it screens soldiers who lack, either temporarily or permanently, the qualities and potential necessary to complete training" (Velky, 1990).

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creation and design of SFAS.

## **B. SFAS OVERVIEW**

Special Forces Assessment and Selection “is designed to identify a self-disciplined individual who is physically fit, intelligent, motivated, trainable, and possesses the attributes that will enable him to be a successful Special Forces soldier”<sup>7</sup> (SWCS Regulation 611-1, 1997). SFAS is based on four principles; “physically demanding, sleep deprivation, induced stress, and increasing performance objectives” (Potter, 1998). These four principles, to various degrees, are inherent to all Special Forces missions. “SFAS attempts to capture a soldier's profile by first administering a series of mental, learning and personality tests, and secondly by processing the soldier through a series of field-related assessment activities” (Velky, 1990). The following is a list of the “mental, learning, personality test” and the “field related assessment activities”.

### **Mental/Learning/Personality**

- Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB)
- 16 Personality Factor Test (16PF)
- Wonderlic Personnel Intelligence Test (WPIT)
- Minnesota Multifacet Personality Inventory (MMPI)
- Assembling Objects Test (AOT)

### **Field Related Assessment Activities**

- Situation Reaction Events (SRs)
- Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT)

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<sup>7</sup> USAJFKSWCS Reg 611-1 is the regulation that governs the conduct of SFAS.

- Short, Medium and Long Distance Runs (Runs)
- Obstacle Course (O Course)
- Short, Medium and Long Distance Ruckmarches (Rucks)<sup>8</sup>
- Military orienteering (MO)
- Log drills (LD)

SFAS is conducted in a neutral, formal and disciplined environment. "Candidates will participate in approximately 25 activities designed to place them under various forms of physical and mental stress where specific performance and behaviors are assessed" (SWCS Reg 611-1, 1997). The events are performed with limited information and no performance feedback. Candidates are never harassed, threatened, or encouraged.

SFAS EVENTS are designed so that candidates will not necessarily achieve the performance levels (standards) set, and therefore ARE NOT PASS OR FAIL EVENTS. The levels of performance are set so candidates can be evaluated based on how well they perform in trying to achieve them (SWCS Regulation 611-1).

The task, conditions, and standards for all events, except the Army physical fitness test, are "restricted in nature" and are not discussed in this thesis.

The entire SFAS process is conducted over 24 days. The first five days are dedicated to in processing and individual assessment activities such as aptitude testing, the Army swim and physical fitness test, and a short distance ruckmarch. The next eight days are still individual oriented events but are more physically demanding in nature. These events consist of various distance runs, an obstacle course, ruckmarches and

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<sup>8</sup> Ruckmarches are individual foot movements while carrying a minimum of 45 pounds.

military orienteering. The next two days include log drills and "general subjects." The "general subjects" provide the candidates with skills that will be useful in the next series of events. These two days are also less physically demanding than the previous week and allow the candidates a brief recovery period. The next six days are predominately team oriented events. These "situation and reaction stakes" assesses a candidate's behavior while working as part of a team. The last field related assessment activity is a long distance ruckmarch. The last six days tend to be the most physically demanding part of the assessment process. From day six through day 22 the candidates are allowed a maximum of four hours of sleep a day. The last two days of SFAS consists of out-processing and determining the candidate's suitability (selection board) for Special Forces training.

### **1. Cadre/Assessor Roles and Procedures**

The purpose of the assessors is to ensure a fair and impartial assessment of each volunteer's performance. This assessment is based on the assessor's observation and evaluation of each candidate. "The primary role of the SFAS cadre is to assess each candidate's potential for acceptable levels of performance" (SWCS Reg 611-1, 1997). All documented assessments are based on the candidate's actual performance. Assessors will only rate an attribute if it has been observed. A standardized assessment form is used to assess a candidate's performance. These assessments are forwarded to the selection board and used to determine a candidate's suitability to attend SFQC and subsequent Special Forces duty.



## **2. Candidate Withdrawal**

There are three ways a candidate may not complete the SFAS program: voluntary, involuntary, or medical withdrawal. A voluntary withdrawal is when a candidate chooses not to continue in the SFAS program. The candidate will state why he is withdrawing and signs the standardized withdrawal form. An "involuntary withdrawal is the removal of a candidate from the SFAS Program, by authorized personnel, for reasons determined through the assessment and selection process" (SWCS Reg 611-1, 1997). A candidate may be involuntarily withdrawn from SFAS for the following reasons: failing to obey instructions or refusing to participate in any event, failing to demonstrate the necessary attributes or potential to continue in the SFAS Program, violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and integrity violations. A candidate also may be involuntarily withdrawn if he jeopardizes fellow candidates in the completion of their Situation Reaction event or cannot maintain pace with his team. Additionally if a candidate falls back 15 or more meters from his team he will be involuntarily withdrawn. However the candidate will be warned three times to keep pace with his team before he is involuntarily withdrawn. A candidate may be medically withdrawn from the Program if his condition is certified by a medical doctor or Physician's Assistant. "A candidate will not be medically withdrawn within 24 hours of completion of the last event. The candidate who is deemed to be medically unfit to train will be placed on medical rest and his assessment file will go before the selection board for consideration" (SWCS Reg 611-1, 1997).

### **3. Selection Board**

The purpose of the selection board is to examine the potential Special Forces soldier's assessment packet and select or nonselect a candidate to attend SFQC. The board is comprised of at least seven, but not more than nine Special Forces qualified officers and senior non-commission officers. The president of the board will be a colonel, usually the Commander of the 1st Special Warfare Training Group. The board president may override any vote and makes the final decision over whether a candidate will be selected. At least three selectors will be field grade officers, three in the grade of E9, one from a minority group, and one from the Army Reserves. Additionally one chief warrant officer (CW3, 4, or 5) may be a board member. All board members have equal votes. The board will only review the assessment packets of candidates that failed to meet the minimum standards. The members of the selection board may "request interviews with either candidates or cadre (assessors) for purpose of clarifying a candidates performance or an assessor's method of evaluation" (SWCS Reg 611-1, 1997). The results of the board are then forwarded to the Commanding General of SWCS for validation. (SWCS Reg 611-1, 1997)

This chapter provided the reader with an overview of SFAS, why it was created, and how it has evolved. However the most pertinent aspect of the chapter is the description of the methodology employed by SWCS. The links between the Special Forces missions, required attributes, and testing methods are vital to the rest of the thesis. The description of methodological process is a critical component in evaluating the attributes, test methods and the proposed new model for selecting the potential Special Forces officer.

### **III. SPECIAL FORCES MISSIONS & ATTRIBUTES**

This chapter provides an explanation of how the current attributes, which are the building blocks of SFAS, were derived and why they are important. To gain a better understanding of how these attributes relate to the requirements of a Special Forces officer a discussion of the five doctrinal missions is in order. This discusses also highlights the role of the officer in each specific mission and the prominent characteristics of that mission. It then identifies and defines the thirteen current attributes that are tested for in SFAS. Additionally, in order to improve on the current attributes, this study proposes two additional attributes that the author believes are vital to accomplishing two of the five Special Forces missions.

The final and most important portion of this chapter analyzes the validity of the attributes. It does this by creating a matrix that matches the attribute to the mission, and evaluates the degree to which each attribute is needed. Currently there is no matrix or document that correlates the targeted attributes with each specific Special Forces mission. Based off of this analysis, and the characteristics of the Special Forces missions, a "spectrum of missions and attributes" diagram is created. This diagram identifies the prominent attributes needed for a specific mission. Additionally it highlights the prominent attributes that are common to all Special Forces missions. The spectrum of missions and attributes diagram helps illustrate what the best or appropriate "type" of officer "looks like". The diagram is also useful in Chapter IV, when the testing methods that SFAS employs is analyzed. The analysis of the attributes is the first of two that attempts to establish the direct correlation between the Special Forces missions, required

personal attributes, and testing methods. As mentioned previously this direct correlation is crucial to the validity of the SFAS process.

#### **A. ATTRIBUTE DEVELOPMENT**

The thirteen attributes currently used in SFAS were derived in August 1992 by a panel of ARI researchers and Special Forces "officers and NCOs in charge of SFAS" (Zananis, 1997). As noted previously, the findings of the "front end analysis of mission requirements" (implemented in 1995) confirmed the panel's findings regarding the attributes. The importance of these attributes and how they pertain to the officer are justified by the nature of the Special Forces mission: "The unique, often high risk, and strategic nature of Special Forces missions requires that the soldiers and especially the officers be carefully selected... as the only commissioned officer on the team, he is not only the commander, but is the leader/manager/soldier at the first line of supervision - responsible for all that the unit does or fails to do" (Baratto, 1998)<sup>9</sup>. There is a certain amount of "acceptable risk associated with Special Forces missions that require a better caliber officer" (Rothstein, 1998). As mentioned previously, most Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) missions are conducted unilaterally with little or no immediate support from U.S. forces. These potentially "high stakes operations require assurances of success, therefore [a] more exacting selection program" (Rothstein, 1998) that tests and assesses the targeted attributes is necessary. Officers that possess these attributes to a higher degree enhance mission success.

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<sup>9</sup> MG (RET) David Baratto was the commanding general of SWCS when the first SFAS course was conducted.

## **B. SPECIAL FORCES MISSIONS**

Special Forces are required to perform five doctrinal missions: Unconventional Warfare (UW), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Direct Action (DA), Special Reconnaissance (SR), and Combating Terrorism (CBT). Some of these missions are conducted more frequently than others (FID) and some have never been conducted (UW & CBT) by Army Special Forces. Regardless, Special Forces personnel are expected to accomplish all doctrinal missions. The majority of these missions are unique to Special Forces and call for officers with a particular array of attributes. Specifically in UW and FID, the officer plays a critical role in the success or failure of the mission. A discussion of each of the five missions follows.

### **1. Unconventional Warfare (UW) is defined as.**

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled, or politically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by (an) external source(s) during all conditions of war and peace (FM 31-20, 1990).

"UW is the most challenging of all SF missions because it involves protracted operations with indigenous forces in denied territory" (FM 31-20, 1990). It is Special Forces *raison d'être*. UW encompasses all Special Forces missions. The essence of UW is conducting operations "by, with, and through indigenous people" (Boyatt, 1998).

The OSS, which was the forerunner for Special Forces, performed UW operations in WWII. The OSS was responsible for establishing resistance organization to combat

the Germans in the European Theater of operations and the Japanese in Asia. The OSS employed a variety of tactics and techniques such as sabotage, establishing evasion and recovery nets, and directing combat operations via proxies.

UW requires the operators to work closely with various types of people to accomplish the mission. These various types of people will invariably come from diverse backgrounds and cultures. Mission success is directly related to how well the operators, especially the officer, are able to interact with their local allies. UW is a "very people oriented" type of mission and strong interpersonal skills are an essential. The Special Forces officer is constantly playing a crucial role in UW; he is the conduit between the ODA and the indigenous force. The officer's action alone can determine success or failure of the mission. He must establish and maintain a harmonious rapport and credibility with the indigenous force for the mission to succeed.

Unconventional Warfare environments usually are austere, and contact with U.S. personnel outside of the ODA is limited. This environment is physically demanding and constantly taxes the operator's cognitive and interpersonal aptitude. The officer's leadership skills, as in all Special Forces missions, are essential for success. UW is the most difficult Special Forces mission to perform, partly because it is heavily dependent on the interaction between the officer and indigenous force leaders. It is very difficult to prepare for the personal interaction that must and will take place between the officer and the indigenous people. The officer must be able to strike a delicate balance between the indigenous force leaders and the U.S. military objectives. It is critical in a UW environment that the officer possesses the capacity to "think on his feet" in a variety of settings.

### UW Characteristics

- Long duration
- Little or no U.S. logistical support
- Isolated from U.S. culture
- Usually exposed to harsher environmental conditions and physically demanding
- Operation conducted in hostile area
- Constantly working/living with indigenous populace, operations conducted "by with and through indigenous personnel"
- Greater ambiguity, flexibility is paramount
- Influenced felt from several external sources outside U.S. military channels
- No "cookie cutter" panacea
- Necessity for sensitivity to the indigenous cultural
- Cross cultural communication and language skills are essential
- Higher level of independent action and decision making
- Multi-dimensional battlefield calls for a multi-framed & mentally flexible thinker
- High level of risk for personal physical harm

2. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is very closely related to UW; many of the attributes that are required in FID are also required in UW. FM 31-20, the Doctrine for Special Forces Operations defines FID as the following: "Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency" (FM 31-20,

1990). Hitherto Special Forces have conducted FID more than any other of the five doctrinal missions.

Foreign Internal Defense missions are conducted across the entire spectrum of conflict. Traditionally, FID is a peacetime mission conducted in a permissive environment. However, Special Forces have conducted FID in semi-permissive environments (such as El Salvador) and in non-permissive environments (such as South Vietnam). Typical FID missions deploy ODAs to foreign countries to provide training and advice to the host nation's military forces. Once again the officer's role is to establish and maintain rapport and credibility with the host nation's officers. FID missions also require the ODA and especially the officer to interact with U.S. civilian and military personnel of the U.S. Embassy-Country team. Mission success often depends on the officer's interpersonal skills as well as the ODA providing expert advice and training. The officer must possess the cognitive and social skills that allows him to "think on his feet" in a variety of scenarios (tactical, diplomatic, and social). Therefore, an important factor in FID is the personality of the officer and the manner in which he is received by the host nation. In this respect FID missions are difficult to prepare for because they are usually personality driven. FID tends to be more mentally demanding than physically challenging.

#### FID Characteristics

- Relatively long duration
- Separated from U.S culture
- Working/living with Host Nation soldiers
- Multi-framed thinker & mental flexibility required



- Varied U.S. material support, dependent on Host Nation
- Influenced felt from several external sources outside U.S. military channels
- Cross Cultural Communication and language skills required
- Lower risk of personal physical harm

### 3. Direct Action (DA) defined by FM 31-20 is.

Short-duration strikes and other small scale offensive actions by special operations forces to seize, destroy, capture, recover or inflict damage on designated personnel or material. In the conduct of these operations, special operations forces may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; and conduct independent sabotage (FM 31-20, 1990).

Since becoming a recognized branch of the Army in April of 1987, Special Forces have conducted a limited number of DA missions. Nevertheless, failing in a DA mission can result in the loss of life. The attributes that are required for DA missions are different and not as extensive as the attributes required for UW and FID. DA missions require no amicable personal interaction with others except the members of the ODA. This personal interaction among the ODA is really not a requirement but an adjunct.

During operation Just Cause, Special Forces ODAs conducted a DA mission by ambushing a Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) convoy that was attempting to repel the airborne assault by U.S. forces. DA missions usually place the ODA directly in harms way at some point in the mission. The success or failure of most DA mission often lies in the planning phase of the mission. Once the ODA is in the execution phase, they rely on a detailed and synchronized plan, battles drills, and standing operating procedures to ensure the mission success. If the mission goes as planned the officers does not play a

defining role (except in the planning phase). The ODA simply executes a prearranged rehearsed plan. However if the mission does not go according to plan, the officer's role is significantly more important. The survival of the ODA may depend on the officer's decisions and actions. DA missions tax the physical attributes of the officer more than his cognitive attributes. Additionally the officer's cognitive attributes are only challenged in a tactical setting. This tactical setting is often replicated in training exercises, which allows the ODA to prepare properly for conducting DA missions.

#### DA Characteristics

- Short duration
- Precise small scale violent action, offensive in nature
- Higher risk of personal physical harm
- Controlled by one U.S. DOD organization

#### 4. Special Reconnaissance (SR) is defined as:

Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by special operations forces to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristic of a particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessments, and post-strike reconnaissance (FM 31-20, 1990).

Special Reconnaissance is another Special Forces mission that ODAs constantly prepare for but rarely perform. Special Forces ODAs performed this mission in Desert Storm where they provided information on the disposition of Iraqi units. SR has the potential to be very physically demanding depending on the duration and nature of the particular mission.

However, SR does not tax the officer's cognitive or interpersonal attributes. Like DA, the officer is only challenged in a tactical setting, which is planned and rehearsed extensively.

#### SR Characteristics

- Short or long duration relative to the mission
- High level of self-discipline
- Usually very physically demanding
- Generally monotonous or boring
- No immediate support
- Moderate amount of risk for personal physical harm
- Controlled by one U.S. DOD organization

5. Combating Terrorism (CBT) is the last of the five doctrinal missions that Special Forces are expected to conduct. To date, the author is unaware of any CBT missions preformed by Special Forces ODAs. "Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism" (FM 31-20, 1990) is the current definition of CBT. The attributes that are required for CBT are very similar to the attributes required for DA. The major difference between CBT and DA is the political sensitivity associated with CBT missions. Once again the officer's cognitive and interpersonal attributes are not challenged except in a very specific tactical setting.

#### CBT Characteristics

- Small scale short duration operation, offensive in nature
- Precise, highly discriminate, swift violent action
- Higher risk of personal physical harm

- Controlled from one U.S. DOD organization
- Highly specialized skills and training

### C. CURRENT ATTRIBUTES AND DEFINITIONS

This section provides the definitions of the thirteen attributes that are required in a Special Forces soldier. It also provides two additional attributes and the definitions that the author believes are essential to accomplishing two of the five Special Forces missions (UW & FID). The two additional attributes are *perceptiveness* and *interpersonal aptitude*. While these two attributes are essential when conducting UW and FID, they are also critical to building a cohesive ODA. In my experiences and observation of ODAs I have found that the officers that possessed these two additional attributes had a more effective unit. Moreover, the officers that did not possess these two attributes had a less cohesive and effective ODA. The author has no empirical data to support the proposed additional attributes or the assertions concerning the correlation between the additional attributes and officers effectiveness as an ODA commander. They are based on real world experiences and personal interviews of other Special Forces officers that are concerned with the topic of this study.

SWCS has identified and defined thirteen attributes that are required for a Special Forces soldier:

1. Physical Fitness: Displays acceptable levels of muscular strength and endurance, stamina, and motor coordination according to the course requirements.
2. Motivation: Persist at accomplishing the task. Takes the initiative to participate in or complete a task without hesitation or delay.
3. Teamwork: Has the ability to work effectively in a small group environment. Encourages others.

4. Stability: The ability to control emotions (e.g. fear, anger, happiness, frustration) in order to remain effective and efficient in attainment of the objective. Calmness under stress. Does not become unnecessarily excited under pressure.
5. Trustworthiness: Demonstrates integrity and honesty in all actions and words.
6. Accountability: The ability to follow direct instructions and keep track of equipment and self. Shows awareness of and concern for safety rules and restrictions
7. Intelligence: The ability to comprehend and apply concepts. Can recognize and analyze the components of a problem and develop courses of action to solve the problem. Displays common sense.
8. Maturity: The ability to recognize and demonstrate appropriate behavior for a given situation.
9. Communication: The ability to express essential information in a clear and logical manner in order to accomplish the mission.
10. Judgement: The ability to take all known facts into consideration and make logical decisions when choosing among alternative solutions.
11. Influence: The ability to persuade team members to accomplish their common goal. Demonstrates effective use of authority.
12. Decisiveness: The ability to implement a course of action in a firm, prompt, and positive manner. Will not change his decision without good cause.
13. Responsibility: Accomplishes leadership task, including the development and implementation of plans and supervision of others. Ensures the health and welfare of all team members. Completes tasks in accordance with established course constraints, including time constraints for mission accomplishment.

These thirteen attributes are essential to a Special Forces soldier; however, my experience in the field indicates that two other attributes would enhance the potential Special Forces soldiers' and especially the officer's mission performance. These two attributes are perceptiveness and interpersonal aptitude.

#### D. PROPOSED ADDITIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND DEFINITIONS

1. Perceptiveness: The ability to quickly recognize, assimilate, and synthesis one's environment. This includes receiving and interpreting the subtle emotional cues of verbal and nonverbal communication.<sup>10</sup>
2. Interpersonal aptitude: The ability to use ones intrinsic social qualities to get along, work harmoniously, and be accepted by others.

The following matrix matches the current attributes and proposed attributes (highlighted in bold print) with the specific Special Forces mission. It also differentiates the degrees to which the targeted attribute is needed for accomplishing a particular mission using a five point rating scale. The number 5 indicates an attribute that is absolutely essential to the success of the operation; 4 indicates an attribute that strongly contributes to the success of the mission but is not essential; 3 indicates an attribute that contributes to the success of the operation; 2 indicates an attribute that only is marginally needed for success; 1 indicates an attribute that is not needed at all. After the numerical value is assigned to each attribute and mission it is totaled and averaged. The average expresses the overall relationship between the missions and attributes. A higher overall average indicates a more congruent relationship between the mission and attribute.

The following matrix serves two purposes and the matrices are analyzed in conjunction with the specific purpose. The purpose of the first matrix is to show the relationship of each individual Special Forces mission as it relates to all the attributes (vertical analysis).

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<sup>10</sup> Portions of this definition were taken from the term "Emotional Sensitivity" that

The purpose of the second matrix is to show the relationship of each individual attribute as it relates to all the missions (horizontal analysis). The first matrix considered is the vertical analysis followed by the horizontal analysis.

When considering the matrix, it is important to remember the definitions of the attributes as set forth above. The numerical value assigned to the specific attribute and mission is not supported by any empirical data, primarily because no such data exist. It is based on the author's field experience and personal interviews and surveys with other Special Forces officers. The survey was conducted in July 1998 with ten Special Forces officers attending the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey California. The appendix titled "Surveyed Officers" provides the names of the officers that participated in the survey. The matrix is located on the following page.

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is used in the test of Social Skills.

### Numerical Rating of Attributes and Missions

Attribute/Mission	UW	FID	DA	SR	CBT	AVE
Physical Fitness	4.8	3.3	4.2	5	4.1	4.28
Motivation	5	4	5	5	5	4.80
Teamwork	4.7	4.1	5	4.7	5	4.70
Stability	5	5	5	5	5	5
Trustworthiness	5	5	4.5	4.6	4.5	4.72
Accountability	5	5	5	5	5	5
Intelligence	5	5	4.1	4.3	3.9	4.46
Maturity	5	5	5	5	5	5
Communication	5	5	4.5	4.7	4.5	4.74
Judgement	5	5	5	5	5	5
Influence	5	5	4.9	4.7	4.8	4.82
Decisiveness	5	5	5	5	5	5
Responsibility	5	5	5	5	5	5
Perceptiveness	5	5	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.88
Interpersonal	5	5	3.2	3.9	3.1	4.04
Average	4.96	4.76	4.67	4.77	4.64	

**Table 1. Numerical Rating of Attributes and Missions**

In reviewing the matrix we find a highly congruent relationship between the attributes and mission. The overall numerical values of the matrix support this



conclusion. Taking a closer look at the vertical ratings, which focuses on the relationship between the specific mission and all the attributes, reveals that UW has the highest average (4.96). SR and FID have the next highest average, 4.77 and 4.76 respectfully. DA and CBT have the lowest average, 4.67 and 4.64 respectfully. However a "lowest average is still relatively high and acceptable. The Attribute/Mission matrix reinforces SWCS and ARI findings with respect to the current attributes. Based on the vertical analysis of the Attribute/Mission matrix, the current attributes, as well as our two additional attributes, directly support accomplishing the Special Forces missions.

In reviewing the horizontal numerical values, which expresses the relationship between a specific attribute and the Special Forces mission in the aggregate, we find a highly congruent relationship. Seven of the attributes have an average score of 5 and six of the fifteen attributes score is higher than 4.5. The two attributes that receive the lowest score are *Physical Fitness* (4.28) and *Interpersonal Aptitude* (4.04)<sup>11</sup>. These however, are still relatively high. This congruent relationship is paramount. A low congruent relationship between the missions and attributes would invalidate the SFAS process.

## **E. SPECTRUM OF MISSIONS & ATTRIBUTES**

The next section introduces the "Spectrum of Missions and Attributes" diagram (page 33) that will help to identify the prominent attributes associated with each Special Forces mission. The illustration serves three purposes: First, it helps in identifying the

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<sup>11</sup> Although the attribute of Interpersonal Aptitude is comparatively low to the majority of the attributes the author believes it is still a critical attribute. I base this on the fact that ODAs are conducting FID and FID type missions more than the other four missions combined.

type of officer Special Forces requires and, conversely, the type of officer that would be detrimental to Special Forces. Second, the diagram helps us identify the prominent attributes that are common to all five Special Forces missions. This second purpose is extremely useful when analyzing the testing methods of SFAS, specifically in regard to exactly what attributes are being tested and evaluated. Third, the diagram can provide us with insight into an officer's natural inclination towards a specific mission. Although SFAS must select the officer that "can do it all", it still may be useful to know an officers specific strengths and comparative weaknesses. The utility of the last purpose would be in the actual ODA that the officer is assigned to, for example, a FID ODA or a SR ODA. It is reasonable to assume that an officer assigned to an ODA that is more in line with his intrinsic aptitude will perform better.

The "Spectrum of Missions and Attributes" diagram was constructed using the following methodology: The first step was to array the missions across the spectrum. This was done based on the similar characteristics of the missions. UW is placed on the left end of the spectrum and CBT on the right. The second step was to determine the most prominent attributes needed to accomplish the specific mission. This was based on the "Attribute/Mission" matrix (page 30), which numerically rates the attributes based on the degree that a specific attribute is needed to accomplish a specific mission. An attribute that did not receive a rating of "5" was not considered. In an attempt to reduce and refine the number of prominent attributes the author eliminated some attributes that are closely related to each other, for example, accountability was usually eliminated but responsibility was not. The author also used his personal field experiences and knowledge of the Special Forces missions to further refine the most prominent attributes.

In reviewing the "Spectrum of Missions and Attributes" diagram, we find five prominent attributes common to all Special Forces missions: stability, maturity, judgement, decisiveness, and responsibility. As a minimum all Special Forces officers must possess these attributes to a high degree and the testing methods at SFAS should concentrate more heavily on these prominent attributes. However in comparing the attributes needed for the two missions on the extreme ends of the spectrum, UW & CBT, we find a discrepancy in five attributes that are essential in accomplishing UW. The attributes in question are intelligence, communication, influence, perceptiveness, and interpersonal aptitude. Because these five attributes are essential to accomplishing UW and FID, and Special Forces is conducting FID more than any other mission, it is critical that SFAS also focuses its testing methods to account for these attributes. This diagram illustrates the type of officer Special Forces requires. Additionally, it will be particularly useful when evaluating exactly what attributes are being tested for at SFAS.




Figure 1. Spectrum of Missions and Attributes

The relationship between missions and attributes, shown in the above diagram, can help us identify and select the "right" officer. The following quote from the 1998 U. S. Special Operations Forces Posture Statement illuminates the type of officer Special Forces is looking for: "...mature, high-caliber professionals with intelligence, stamina, problem-solving skills, mental toughness, flexibility, determination, integrity, and extraordinary strength of character and will". From the Spectrum of missions and attributes diagram and characteristics of the Special Forces missions we can draw some conclusions in regard to the type of officer Special Forces does *not* need. The following attributes would be in direct contrast to the ideal Special Forces officer: propensity for clarity and rigidity, imperceptive, xenophobic, a low aptitude for cross culture communication, low interpersonal aptitude, and a one-dimensional thinker/problem solver.

This chapter has summarized the five doctrinal missions of Special Forces, the role of the officer in accomplishing the missions and the characteristics of the Special Forces missions. It also introduced two additional attributes that are pertinent to UW and FID: perceptiveness and interpersonal aptitude. The spectrum of missions and attributes diagram highlighted the prominent attributes associated with each specific Special Forces mission. This diagram helps in determining the type of officer Special Forces desires and does not desire. The Attribute/Mission matrix established a direct connection between Special Forces missions and the existing and proposed attributes. This high correlation supports the validity and relevancy of the attributes. Establishing this direct relationship between the attributes and missions is crucial to the validity of the SFAS process. The direct correlation between the attributes and the missions is the first of two analyses that

evaluates the SFAS program. The second portion evaluated is the relationship between the attributes and the testing methods, which is covered in the next chapter.



#### **IV. TESTING METHODS**

This chapter evaluates the relationship between the testing methods SFAS employs and the attributes required in the potential Special Forces officer. The first part of this chapter introduces the testing methods of SFAS and gives an explanation of what the testing methods measures. The second part seeks to determine the relationship between the testing methods and the required attributes. It accomplishes this by creating a matrix that matches not only the exact testing method to the specific attribute, but the degree to which the attribute is measured. There must be a high correlation between the testing methods and the attributes or this portion of SFAS is not relevant and compromises the entire SFAS process.

##### **A. PURPOSE OF TESTING METHODS**

"SFAS attempts to capture a soldier's profile by first administering a series of mental, learning and personality tests, and secondly by processing the soldier through a series of field-related assessment activities" (Velky, 1990,). The "mental, learning, and personality tests" are "paper and pencil" tests that give insight to a soldier's personality, level of intelligence, integrity, and spatial ability<sup>12</sup>. The primary purpose of these tests is "to identify candidates that are prone to high risk or deviant behavior"<sup>13</sup> (Banks, 1997) and to identify candidates that are trainable to Special Forces standards (Brown, 1998). The secondary purpose is to measure some of the attributes that a Special Forces soldier

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<sup>12</sup> Dr. Michele Zananis is a psychologist at ARI who conducts research and analysis for the SFAS.

<sup>13</sup> LTC Ernie Banks, an Army psychologist, was one of the original project officers that helped establish SFAS.

must possess. The "field related assessment activities" are physically oriented events that measure the required attributes that the "paper and pencil" are unable to measure or do not measure very accurately. It also measures how the individual performs on their own and as a member of a team. (Velky, 1990)

## **B. MATRICES METHODOLOGY**

The following matrices serve two purposes and the matrices are analyzed in conjunction with the specific purpose. The first set of matrices, beginning on page 41, illustrates the perceived relationship and the degree to which each individual testing method assesses the attributes (vertical analysis). The second set of matrices, found on page 43, shows the perceived relationship and degree to which each individual attribute is assessed by testing methods (horizontal analysis). The proposed attributes (highlighted in bold) are also included in the matrices. The first set of matrices considered is the vertical analysis followed by the horizontal analysis. A discussion of the findings is provided after each matrix is reviewed.

The methodologies underlining the two matrices are identical. A five point rating scale is used to determine the degree that the testing method measures the targeted attribute. The number 5 indicates that the testing method directly measures the targeted attribute. The number 4 indicates a high correlation between the testing method and targeted attributed but is not measured directly. The number 3 indicates a moderate correlation between the testing method and targeted attribute but not a high correlation. The number 2 indicates a low correlation between the testing method and targeted attribute. The number 1 indicates no correlation between the testing method and the



targeted attribute. After the numerical value is assigned to each attribute and testing method it is averaged. The average expresses the perceived relationship between the testing method and attributes. A higher overall average indicates a more congruent relationship between the testing method and attribute. When considering the matrix it is important to remember the definitions of the attributes found on page 26.

A plenitude of empirical data exists to support the validity of the "Mental/Learning/Personality" test found in the SFAS program. Experts in the field of psychological testing accept these four "Paper and Pencil" tests to have substantial reliability and validity (Brown, 1998). However, due to the uniqueness of SFAS, there is no empirical data to support or refute the reliability and validity of the Field Related Assessment Activities. The Field Related Assessment Activities findings are derived from the author's personal experience and other Special Forces officers that successfully completed the Field Related Assessment Activities and SFAS. The numerical rating found in the Field Related Assessment Activities matrices are based on ten surveys from Special Forces Captains and Majors in August of 1998 at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California<sup>14</sup>. The matrices reflect the surveyed officer experiences, opinions, and perceptions of SFAS. The author acknowledges that the ratings of the matrices are based on a small convenient sample, however the author believes it is an accurate reflection of the current SFAS program. Additionally, it is most important to note that the Field Related Assessment Activities must be consider in how they relate to performing the duties of a Special Forces officer, in particular as an ODA commander.

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<sup>14</sup> The names of the officers that participated are found in the appendix.

They must be considered in this manner or it is contrary to the purpose of SFAS, selecting an individual for a specific function. Before examining the first set of matrices, found on page 41, a list of the testing methods is provided.

#### **Paper and Pencil Tests**

- Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB)<sup>15</sup>
- 16 Personality Factor Test (16PF)
- Wonderlic Personnel Intelligence Test (WPIT)
- Minnesota Multifacet Personality Inventory (MMPI)
- Assembling Objects Test (AOT) (Brown, 1998)

#### **Field Related Assessment Activities**

- Situation Reaction Events (SRs)
- Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT)
- Short, Medium and Long Distance Runs (Runs)
- Obstacle Course (O Course)
- Short, Medium and Long Distance Ruckmarches (Rucks)
- Military orienteering (MO)
- Log drills (LD)

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<sup>15</sup> The DLPT is not considered in the matrix because its' sole function is to determine an individuals aptitude to learn a foreign language. It is not intended to measure any of the other targeted attributes.

**Set 1: Vertical Analysis of the Paper and Pencil Test**

<b>Attribute/Test</b>	<b>16PF</b>	<b>WPFT</b>	<b>MMPI</b>	<b>AOT</b>
Physical Fitness	1	1	1	1
Motivation	5	1	1	1
Teamwork	1	1	1	1
Stability	4	1	5	1
Trustworthiness	4	1	3	1
Accountability	1	1	1	1
Intelligence	1	5	1	4
Maturity	3	1	3	1
Communication	1	1	1	1
Judgement	1	4	1	4
Influence	4	1	1	1
Decisiveness	4	1	1	1
Responsibility	4	1	2	1
Perceptiveness	1	1	1	1
Interpersonal	1	1	1	1
Average	2.4	1.46	1.60	1.40

**Table 2. Vertical Analysis of Paper and Pencil Tests**

Since the author is not qualified to comment on the above matrix, a qualified Psychologist rated the Paper and Pencil matrix<sup>16</sup>. In reviewing the above matrix we find a generally low average and perceived congruencies between the specific testing methods and the attributes. The 16PF test has the highest mean average of 2.4. Even though the 16PF mean average is low it does measure six attributes to at least a “high” degree. The MMPI has the next highest mean average (1.60); however still relatively low. The WPFT and AOT have the lowest mean average, 1.46 and 1.40, respectively. We will now examine the Field Related Assessment activities found on the following page.

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<sup>16</sup> Dr Robert Kilcullen, a Research Psychologist at ARI filled in the matrix.

### Set 1: Vertical Analysis of the Field Related Assessment Activities

Attribute/Test	SRs	APFT	Runs	O Course	Rucks	MO	LD
Physical Fit	5	4.1	4.1	5	4.8	4.8	3.5
Motivation	5	3.4	3.5	4.3	4.6	4.0	3.1
Teamwork	5	1	1	1	1	1	4.8
Stability	4.7	1.4	1.3	3.7	2.7	3.9	3
Trustworthiness	1.5	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	3.1	1.1
Accountability	2.8	1.5	1.5	1.7	2.1	2.8	1.7
Intelligence	2.5	1	1	1.4	1	3.6	1
Maturity	3.7	1.2	1.2	2.1	1.8	2.1	2.4
Communication	3.7	1	1	1	1	1	2.2
Judgement	2.1	1.1	1.2	2.3	1.7	3.3	1.1
Influence	4.6	1	1	1	1	1	2
Decisiveness	3.3	1	1	1.3	1.1	2.3	1.5
Responsibility	2.6	1.1	1.1	1.7	2.1	3	1.1
Perceptiveness	1.2	1	1	1	1	1	1.1
Interpersonal	3	1	1	1	1	1	1.2
Average	3.38	1.46	1.46	1.97	1.88	2.52	2.05

**Table 3. Vertical Analysis of Field Related Assessment Activities**

The above matrix reveals a generally low perceived relationship between the specific testing methods and the attributes. The Situation Reaction events achieved the highest mean average (3.38). The testing method with the next highest mean average is

the Military Orienteering (2.52) followed by the Log Drills (2.05). Then significantly lower, compared to the Situation Reaction events, are the Obstacle Course (1.97) and Ruckmarches (1.88). The testing methods that have the lowest congruent relationship are the Army Physical Fitness Test and the Runs, with a mean average of 1.46. A point to note in this matrix is that the SRs have a "moderate" to "high" relationship between the testing methods and attributes, even though the overall relationship of all the testing methods are low. This point will be examined in the section titled "matrices Summary". We will now examine the second set of matrices, the horizontal analysis. The Paper and Pencil matrix will be reviewed first followed by the Field Related Assessment Actives. The Paper and Pencil test is located on the following page.

### Set 2: Horizontal Analysis of the Paper and Pencil Matrix

Attribute/Test	16PF	WPFT	MMPI	AOT	Ave
Physical Fitness	1	1	1	1	1
Motivation	5	1	1	1	2
Teamwork	1	1	1	1	1
Stability	4	1	5	1	2.75
Trustworthiness	4	1	3	1	2.25
Accountability	1	1	1	1	1
Intelligence	1	5	1	4	2.75
Maturity	3	1	3	1	2
Communication	1	1	1	1	1
Judgement	1	4	1	4	2.5
Influence	4	1	1	1	1.75
Decisiveness	4	1	1	1	1.75
Responsibility	4	1	2	1	2
Perceptiveness	1	1	1	1	1
Interpersonal	1	1	1	1	1

**Table 4. Horizontal Analysis of Paper and Pencil Tests**

The above matrix reveals a low perceived relationship for the targeted attributes and the testing methods. Only four attributes, stability, trustworthiness, intelligence, and judgement achieved an average between 2.25 and 2.75. Five of the attributes average

ranged between 2 and 1.75. Six of the remaining fifteen attributes received the lowest rating of one. We will now examine the Field Related Assessment Activities.

**Set 2: Horizontal Analysis of the Field Related Assessment Activities**

Attribute/Test	SRs	APFT	Runs	O course	Rucks	MO	LD	Ave
Physical Fit	5	4.1	4.1	5	4.8	4.8	3.5	4.47
Motivation	5	3.4	3.5	4.3	4.6	4	3.1	3.98
Teamwork	5	1	1	1	1	1	4.8	2.11
Stability	4.7	1.4	1.3	3.7	2.7	3.9	3	2.95
Trustworthiness	1.5	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	3.1	1.1	1.48
Accountability	2.8	1.5	1.5	1.7	2.1	2.8	1.1	1.92
Intelligence	2.5	1	1	1.4	1	3.6	1	1.64
Maturity	3.7	1.2	1.2	2.1	1.8	2.1	2.4	2.07
Communication	3.7	1	1	1	1	1	2.2	1.55
Judgement	2.1	1.1	1.2	2.3	1.7	3.3	1.1	1.84
Influence	4.6	1	1	1	1	1	2	1.65
Decisiveness	3.3	1	1	1.3	1.1	2.3	1.5	1.64
Responsibility	2.6	1.1	1.1	1.7	2.1	3	1.1	1.81
Perceptiveness	1.2	1	1	1	1	1	1.1	1.18
Interpersonal	3	1	1	1	1	1	1.2	1.31

**Table 5. Horizontal Analysis of Field Related Assessment Activities**



In reviewing the above matrix we find a variegated relationship between the targeted attributes and the testing methods. The average ranges from a low of 1.18, to a high of 4.47. However, in general, the overall relationship is still relatively low. Only two attributes achieved a rating above 3, physical fitness and motivation, 4.47 and 3.98 respectively. Stability, teamwork, and maturity are the attributes with the next highest mean average but relatively low compared to physical fitness and motivation. The remaining ten attributes average are below 1.92. Even though the overall relationship between the targeted attributes and the testing methods are generally low, it is important to note that the attributes physical fitness and motivation have a "high" relationship to their respective testing methods. This point is germane and will be addressed in the following Chapter.

### **C. MATRICES SUMMARIZED**

The matrices reveal that the overall perceived relationship between and attributes and the testing methods are low. This section reveals that some testing methods are perceived to test some of the targeted attributes to a high degree. The following matrix summarizes the testing methods and the targeted attributes that received a "high" rating (4.0) or above. The matrix places all the testing methods, "Paper and Pencil", and Field Related Assessment Activities, at the top row and the desired attributes in the far-left column. A thick black line separates the two different testing types or categories. Separating the different testing categories will help in determining which testing methods are measuring the targeted attribute to at least a "high" degree.

If a particular testing method did not receive a rating of 4.0 or higher it was not placed in the matrix.

Attempting to determine if a targeted attribute is tested to an adequate degree (i.e. how many different test and times the targeted attribute is tested) is quite difficult. There is no magic formula that will tell us how many times a targeted attribute must be tested to get an accurate assessment of the targeted attribute. In general, however, the more times the targeted attribute is tested, the more reliable the assessment of the targeted attribute is likely to be. We now examine the "Matrices Summary" table and the reader can determine if the targeted attributes are being tested adequately.

**Matrices Summary**

TEST Attributes	Paper and Pencil				Field Related Assessment Activities						
	16 PF	WPFT	MMPI	AOT	SR	APFT	RUNS	O COURSE	RUCKS	MO	LD
Physical Fitness					5	4.1	4.1	5	4.8	4.8	
Motivation	5				5			4.3	4.6	4	
Teamwork					5						4.8
Stability	4		5		4.7						
Trustworthiness	4										
Accountability											
Intelligence		5		4							
Maturity											
Communication											
Judgement		4		4							
Influence	4				4.6						
Decisiveness	4										
Responsibility	4										
Perceptiveness											
Interpersonal											

**Table 6. Matrices Summary**

The above matrix shows how frequently (the number of times) the targeted attributes are tested and by what specific testing method. The frequency of attributes is considered first, followed by the type of testing methods. The matrix reveals that the attributes of physical fitness and motivation are tested to an adequate degree. Physical fitness is tested for six different times by one specific type of testing method (Field Related Assessment Activities). Motivation is tested five different times by two different testing methods. Continuing down the attribute column we find that stability is tested to a high degree three different times by two different testing methods. Teamwork, intelligence, and judgement are measure two different times but by the same type of testing methods, the first by the Field related Assessment Activities and the last two by the Paper and Pencil tests. The attribute of influence is tested twice by two different testing methods. Accountability, decisiveness, and responsibility are tested for only once and by the same type of testing methods (Paper and Pencil test). The attributes of accountability, maturity, communication, perceptiveness, and interpersonal aptitude are not tested to a high degree. Moving to the testing methods the matrix reveals that the 16PF measures six different attributes and the SR events measure five attributes to at least a "high" degree. The following five testing methods test only two attributes; WPFT, AOT, O Course, Rucks, and the Military Orienteering (MO). The remaining four testing methods test only one attribute to a high degree; MMPI, APFT, Runs, and the Log drills (LD).

The above summary is pertinent to implementing an additional selection process for the potential Special Forces officer to ensure Special Forces are acquiring the "right" officer. SFAS does in fact test some of the attributes to a high degree, but not the

majority of them. The attributes that are not tested to a high degree are the weak link in SFAS. These insufficient testing methods are the focus of chapter V, proposing an additional selection program for the potential Special Forces officer.

This chapter introduced the various testing methods that SFAS employs and what attributes the testing methods attempt to measure. Two sets of matrices were created to analyze and evaluate the various testing methods. This analysis revealed that some of the attributes that Special Forces desire in their officers are tested and measured to a high degree, namely, physical fitness, motivation, teamwork and stability. However the overall analysis revealed that there is a generally low perceived congruent relationship between the testing methods and all of the attributes. The current SFAS program is too narrow, in regard to testing all the mandatory attributes. SFAS is predominately based on physically oriented testing methods that do not test all the mandatory attributes. Referring back to Chapter II, we see that 16 of 24 days are dedicated to physically orientated testing methods. These physically oriented testing methods suggest that there is a proportionality problem with the current SFAS program. Taking a closer look at the total hours involved in the SFAS process, we find that 142 hours out of 158 are dedicated to "field hours" or physical related assessment activities.<sup>17</sup> The physically oriented testing methods are sufficient for testing some of the targeted attributes, five to be exact,<sup>18</sup> but are inadequate for the remaining eleven.

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<sup>17</sup> This data is based on the "Commanders Brief", slide 10, Program Activities.

<sup>18</sup> The five attributes that are measured to a sufficient or high degree are Physical fitness, motivation, teamwork, stability, and influence. Refer to "Matrices Summary" on page 46.

The "Matrices Summary" table highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of SFAS testing methods. The "Matrices Summary" table also lays the foundation for building an additional selection program for the potential Special Forces officer that accounts for the attributes that are not tested to a "high" degree. Since the majority of the mandatory attributes are not tested to a "high" degree, it is reasonable to assume a disconnect exists in the SFAS process in regard to relevancy, accuracy, and validity of the testing methods. As mentioned previously, a disconnect or significant deficiencies in either the mandatory attributes or testing methods compromises the entire SFAS process and suggest the program is not working optimally. The next chapter addresses the deficiencies in the testing methods in an attempt to gain a more accurate and clear picture of the desired potential Special Forces officer.



## **V. ADDITIONAL TESTING METHODS**

This chapter provides a general framework of additional testing methods for selecting the potential Special Forces officer. It is primarily based on the analysis of the testing methods in Chapter IV. These additional testing methods attempts to test the targeted attributes that the current program fails to test to a "high" degree. It proposes nine testing methods that already have been validated by civilian and military assessment centers. This model is not a substitute or stand-alone program, it is intended to be used *in conjunction* with the existing SFAS program. Moreover, this chapter does not give a detail step-by-step format for an additional officer selection program or standards that must be achieved. Such specifics, as noted earlier, are beyond the scope of this study.

### **A. METHODOLOGY FOR PROPOSED ADDITIONAL TESTING METHODS**

There are two steps in developing an appropriate program for additional testing methods. The first step in constructing an additional officer selection program is to identify the discrepancies in the current attributes and testing methods. This was done in the two previous chapters. This proposed program is crafted around the attributes that SFAS does not test to a "high" degree. The testing methods that are thoroughly used in SFAS, like physically oriented testing methods, are not used in the proposed model. The second step is to select appropriate types of testing methods in regard to *relevancy* as it relates to performing the duties of a Special Forces ODA commander and to *validity* in respect to the accuracy and reliability of the testing methods.

## **1. Step One: Identifying the Discrepancies**

Before a program for testing, assessing, and selecting the potential Special Forces officer can be constructed, the targeted attributes must be identified. These targeted attributes are based on the "Matrices Summary" table, found on page 48. The following are the targeted attributes for the proposed model: trustworthiness, accountability, intelligence, maturity, communication, judgement, influence<sup>19</sup>, decisiveness, responsibility, perceptiveness, and interpersonal aptitude. These attributes were selected for the following reasons: First, the current SFAS program's testing method(s) does not test the attribute in question to at least a "high" degree by the two different testing method types, where possible, i.e. Paper and Pencil or Field Related Assessment Activities. Second, the specific test does not test all the essential aspects of the targeted attribute.

## **2. Step Two: Selecting Appropriate Testing Methods**

The most reliable and accurate assessment and selection programs employ a redundancy of testing methods. Redundancy refers to the different types of testing methods and the quantity of testing methods. One should "select several different types of procedures [testing methods] and several procedures of the same type for estimating the strength of each variable [attribute]" (Fiske, 1947). This redundancy provides a more complete picture of the targeted attribute/individual. "It is clear that the more one knows

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<sup>19</sup> Although the attribute of influence is tested for to a "high" degree, see "Matrices Summary", page 48, the author believes that the type of testing method is not completely relevant. It does not assess candidate's ability to "influence" others outside of the strict and structured setting of the specific test. It does not encompass the majority of situations in which influence must be exercised (i.e. civilians and Host Nation military).



about a man the more comprehensive will be one's understanding of his unique nature"(Fiske, 1947).

The next section provides the general framework for the proposed model. It offers additional testing methods that measure the targeted attributes that SFAS does not test for to a "high" degree. The tests are derived from the literatures on psychological testing. As mentioned above, these tests are proven reliable and accurate. The framework for the proposed additional testing methods are presented in the following manner: It provides the name of the test, the attribute(s) it measures, and the reference. Many of these testing methods measure just not the targeted attribute but other attributes that are not part of the fifteen mandatory attributes identified in Chapter III. However, this enhances the proposed model because it provides more information which, in turn, helps make a more accurate assessment of the potential Special Forces officer. The additional testing methods for the potential Special Forces officer are expressed in the table on the following page with the eleven targeted attributes highlighted in bold print.

### Proposed Testing Methods

<b>Name of Test</b>	<b>Attributes Assessed</b>	<b>Reference</b>
Belonging	Inference, <b>Perceptiveness</b>	"Assessment of Men", p 92
<b>**Situation</b>	Initiative, "Effective <b>Intelligence</b> ", <b>Interpersonal, Communication, Accountability, **Leadership, Motivation, Perceptiveness, Maturity</b>	"Assessment of Men", p 96 "An Assessment Study of Air Force Officers", p 72
Construction	Stability, <b>Maturity, Leadership, Interpersonal, Perceptiveness, Accountability</b>	"Assessment of Men", p 102
<b>**Interview(s)</b>	<b>Trustworthiness, Intelligence, Initiative, "Psychological Intuition", Communication</b>	"Assessment of Men", p 113
Discussion	<b>Communication</b> ("Verbal Resourcefulness"), Teamwork, <b>Intelligence, Interpersonal, Leadership, Perceptiveness, Initiative</b>	"Assessment of Men", p 129
Resourcefulness	<b>Communication, Intelligence, Accountability, Maturity</b>	"Assessment of Men", p 134
Teaching	<b>Communication, Organization, "Teaching Ability"</b>	"Assessment of Men", p 159
Improvisation	<b>Leadership, Interpersonal</b>	"Assessment of Men", p 168
California Psychological Inventory Test	Independence, <b>Responsibility, Socialization, Self-Control, Good Impression, Tolerance, Intellectual Efficiency, Flexibility</b>	"California Psychological Inventory Test"

**Table 7. Proposed Testing Methods**

**\*\* Situation Test:** There are several different types of "Situation" test. The tests may be tailored to fit a specific setting. This test may be conducted with one of the candidates acting as the "leader" (Situation test with a leader) or with no candidate designated as a leader (Situation test leaderless).

**\*\* Leadership:** SWCS categorizes the following attributes as a component of leadership: communication, influence, decisiveness, and responsibility. The attribute leadership, in regard to the above table, is only used when all four attributes are measured for a particular test.

**\*\* Interview(s):** Two types of interviews should be used, the stress interview and the clinical interview. Both measure the same attributes but under very different settings.

## **B. SUMMARY OF PROPOSED ADDITIONAL TESTING METHODS**

In reviewing table 7 we discover that every targeted attribute is tested at least once. Many are measured several times, which enhances the potential for a more accurate assessment of the potential Special Forces officer. We now look at what attributes are tested and how many times they are tested. The attribute of Trustworthiness is tested once; Accountability and Maturity three times; Judgement, Influence, Decisiveness, and Perceptiveness are tested four times; Intelligence, Responsibility, Interpersonal Aptitude are tested five times; and Communication is tested six times. These nine additional proposed tests shore-up the discrepancies in the targeted attributes and provide the assessor with relevant and important information concerning the attributes of the potential Special Forces officer.

The testing methods in the proposed model eliminate the discrepancies among the attributes not tested to a "high" degree in the current SFAS program. Another benefit of the proposed testing methods is that physical stress is not used to measure the targeted attributes. Physical stress only can bring out some of the targeted attributes. Since the potential Special Forces officer may not always be "tested" only under physical stress it is important to know how the officer will perform under mental or cognitive stress.

This chapter has identified a series of additional testing methods that may be used for selecting the potential Special Forces officer. It also described the methodology behind the creation of the proposed testing methods. These nine additional testing methods accurately measure the attributes that are not tested to a “high” degree in the current SFAS program. The additional testing methods measure all of the targeted attributes at least once. Furthermore, the majority of the targeted attributes are tested several different times by four different testing methods. These additional testing methods are reliable and valid (Sarban, 1998 & Fiske, 1947) and give much needed insight into the “make-up” of the potential Special Forces officer. As stated previously, these proposed additional testing methods are to be used in conjunction with the current SFAS program and not a substitute to the existing program.

## VI. CONCLUSION

### A. SUMMARY

This study has evaluated the current SFAS program by analyzing the attributes that are required in a Special Forces soldier and the testing methods that are used to measure those attributes. The analysis set forth in chapter III argues that the current attributes and the two proposed attributes are valid. However, the analysis in chapter IV, which focused on the testing methods used to measure the candidates attributes, reveals some significant inadequacies. This study also has explored the question of an additional selection program for the potential Special Forces officer and concluded that an additional selection period is needed to properly assess and select the potential Special Forces officer. This assertion is based on the results of the analysis of the testing methods, which suggest that all the required attributes needed in a Special Forces officer are *not* adequately tested. Chapter VI offers additional testing methods for enhancing the selection of the potential Special Forces.

In the course of this research a number of important issues that are directly related to the SFAS program have emerged but fell beyond the scope of this study. I have focused on four observations suggested by my research. After describing each observation, I have developed recommendations to address the issue raised. The first observation pertains to the method of *screening out* verse *screening in*. The second observation addresses *when is enough enough*. The third observation refers to the imbalance or *disparity among the types of testing methods*. The last observation relates to using the assessment of the officers' performance in SFAS to enhance his strengths and

strengthen his weaknesses. Since the last observation can help in assigning the officer to a specific ODA that leverages his strengths; this observation is titled *leveraging the officers' assessment packet*. Each observation will be described and discussed briefly.

## **B. ISSUES**

Observation 1. *Screening out verses screening in:* SFAS employs a screening out verses screening in method for selecting its' potential officers and soldiers. This method entails eliminating candidates that clearly do not possess the attributes that are required in a Special Forces soldier. SFAS does not look for or select the "best" candidates, just the ones that clearly do not meet the standard. Therefore, SFAS accepts some marginal candidates that should not be in Special Forces, but eventually reach the operational units.

This observation raises complexities and there are many external realities that bear on this issue. Due to the scope of this study only a cursory overview of some of the major issues that are related to this observation is provided. One of the major external realities that affects this issue is that Special Forces is a "high demand but low supply organization" (Zanani, 1998). What this means is that Special Forces units have a high operational tempo but a comparatively low supply of volunteers. This problem is also compounded by the long training period needed to produce a Special Forces soldier/officer. It takes between one and two years, after starting the initial training, to put a soldier/officer into an ODA. Special Forces and SFAS are almost forced to continue down this path unless there is a dramatic sustained surge in volunteers.

However if Special Forces prides itself on the quality of its' soldiers/officers it should not hesitate to implement changes to the current SFAS program that will enhance the general quality of the force.

Recommendation: If Special Forces can get a higher "shelf life" out of its available pool of Special Forces qualified Captains it will alleviate a portion of the problem. That is, if the Special Forces Captains could extend their ODA time by at least a year, this would provide the extra time needed to select and train the potential Special Forces officer/soldiers. A possible solution to extending the "shelf life" of the Captains is filling staff positions with senior Warrant officers that are currently filled by Captains.

Observation 2. *When is enough enough:* This observation pertains to the quantity of testing methods at SFAS, especially the Field Related Assessment Activities or the physical events. SWCS Regulation 611-1 states that there are approximately 25 events used to assess the candidate. No evidence has been found to support 25 events. It has been suggested that 25 events were selected to coincide with length of the SFAS. However, based on discussion with the civilian and military personnel familiar with SFAS suggest that the time restriction of the course does not dictate the quantity of testing methods employed. (Brown & Zananis, 1998) I have researched this question extensively via civilian and military experts in this field and have not been able to find a reasonable answer. My question on this issue is: Would there be a higher selection rate on SFAS if some of the physical testing methods were eliminated and replaced with nonphysical testing methods that measure the targeted attributes? I believe that there is a

point of diminishing returns in regard to the physically oriented testing methods. As yet, no empirical data have been developed to test this question.

Recommendation: A study/research pertaining to “when is enough enough” and the “point of diminishing returns” in regard to the physically oriented testing methods should be conducted.

Observation 3. *Disparity among types of testing methods:* This issue is less ambiguous and more straight forward than the preceding two issues. There are approximately 25 tests used in SFAS, and only four of them are “paper and pencil” tests. This indicates that the other 20 or so fall into the “Field Related Assessment Activities” category. There is a clear imbalance between the types of testing methods employed by SFAS. Such a disparity does not lend itself to a valid or relevant assessment of the potential Special Forces officer/soldier. It is reasonable to argue that when one type of testing method is used to such a great degree it distorts the overall assessment of the candidate.

Recommendation: As a minimum, additional non-physical testing methods should be used to assess future SFAS officers. These testing methods should target the attributes that are not measured to a “high” degree by the physically oriented testing methods.

Observation 4. *Leveraging the officers’ assessment packet:* Once the officer has successfully completed SFAS and has been selected to attend the officer SFQC, his assessment packet does not follow him. The assessment packet is a useful tool that can be utilized by the cadre to better train the officer. These assessment packets have a great deal of information that can aid in the training of the potential Special Forces officer.



Recommendation: The officers' assessment packet should be reviewed by the SFAS cadre to highlight the officers' strengths and weaknesses. This evaluation of the officers' strength and weaknesses should be forwarded to the unit that is responsible for training the officer, in this case A/1/1SWTG (A). Alpha Company cadre would then work with the specific officer to enhance his strengths and improve his weaknesses.

### **C. A FINAL THOUGHT**

Selecting the "right man" for the job is a difficult task. In general SFAS has been successful at selecting the right individuals. This is evident by the high success rate in the field and the overall satisfaction expressed by the operational Group and Battalion commanders. Thus, this study is not intended to suggest that SFAS is a failure. It does argue, however, that SFAS can be improved. Improving SFAS should start with the officers for the reason previously stated. This study has offered nine testing methods that will give the SFAS cadre greater relevant insight in the potential Special Forces officer.

Personnel selection is both an art and a science. Assessing and selecting personnel is not a new phenomenon; there are no perfect assessment and selection programs. Predicting human behavior involves too many variables to make it an exact science. However, if the selection criteria (attributes) are valid and the testing methods are valid and relevant, the chances of selecting the "right" individual are greatly enhanced. Even if these two critical factors are congruent there still will be a margin of error. "The assessment of men...is the scientific art of arriving at sufficient conclusion from insufficient data" (Fiske, 1947).



## **APPENDIX**

### **Surveyed Officers**

The following Special Forces officers participated in the surveys that were used for this thesis. The surveys were conducted in July and August 1998 at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California.

CPT Keith Anthony

CPT Tim Bellon

CPT Scott Brower

MAJ Mark Carlson

MAJ Joel Clark

MAJ George Fraser

CPT Eric Haider

MAJ Mark Mitchell

CPT Brad Taylor

CPT David Wilberding



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17. Commander .....2  
USJFKSWCS  
Ft. Bragg, NC 28307-5000
  
18. Dr Michele Zananis .....1  
U. S. Army Research Institute  
5001 Eisenhower Avenue  
Alexenderia, VA 22333-5600